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Abstract 
This thesis provides evidence on the impact on two aspects of auditor 
change for Australian listed companies. Firstly, changes in audit partners are 
mandated, requiring partners rotate off engagements after a fixed tenure. 
Recently, practitioner based concerns about the costs of rotation for both 
auditors and clients have precipitated amendments to the rule in Australia, 
Canada and the UK. Evidence in this thesis shows a cost to clients and auditors 
in the form of increased in audit fees and audit reporting lag in the rotation year 
that corroborates anecdotal practitioner evidence. Secondly, the process of 
voluntarily changing audit firms (auditor switching) is regulated under a 
consent-based framework mitigating information flow to the market. In 2013, 
the Australian corporate regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC), sought stakeholder input on the information provided to 
the market under the consent framework to inform policy deliberations. This 
can be viewed as couching the possibility of a move towards adoption of a 
disclosure-based approach similar to the approach in the US and UK. 
Accordingly, this thesis investigates market reactions to auditor switch 
announcements. Results show no market reactions, consistent with the market 
not considering such disclosures to be informative. The overall findings 
presented in this thesis lend support to the adoption of amendments that allow 
for flexibility. 
